Portable Memory is a trust-centric format — it makes claims about integrity, authenticity, and provable deletion. We take reports about those guarantees seriously.

Please do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.

Report privately via GitHub Security Advisories: on this repository, go to the Security tab → Report a vulnerability. This opens a private channel with the maintainers.

Please include: a description, affected file(s)/function(s), a reproduction (a crafted .mem bundle is ideal), and the impact you foresee. We aim to acknowledge within a few business days and to agree on a disclosure timeline with you.

Until 1.0.0 of the SDK, only the latest tagged release (and main) receives security fixes. The on-disk format is versioned separately (format in the manifest).

In scope — issues in this repository's code or spec, for example:

• Path traversal / zip-slip / symlink escape when reading a bundle.
• Signature forgery or verification bypass (manifest.sig, tombstone signatures).
• Checksum bypass, or a way to make a tampered bundle validate/import.
• secretRef leakage — any path by which plaintext/ciphertext or recoverable secret material leaves a bundle.
• Denial of service from a crafted bundle (memory exhaustion, unbounded work).

A .mem bundle is untrusted input. Readers MUST:

• treat checksums as integrity (corruption detection), not authenticity;
• verify Ed25519 signatures (manifest.sig / tombstones) against a trusted key when authenticity is required (spec §1.3);
• reject bundle paths that escape the bundle root (including via symlinks) and files not listed in the manifest;
• bound per-file size (MemLimits) before reading.

Signing lives in the optional [signing] extra (cryptography); it is imported lazily, so a bundle can be produced or read without it, but authenticity checks are only available when it is installed. A verifier that cannot check a signature MUST NOT treat the bundle as authentic.

Bundles are plaintext by design (inspectable, vendor-neutral). Confidentiality is an envelope concern — encrypt at rest/in transit with your own tooling. Secrets are never carried as plaintext or ciphertext (spec §7).